

Washington, D.C. 20505

*Tactical vs
National*

27 August 1979

Dear Bernie,

We were all very pleased that you would take the time on your first trip back to Washington as SACEUR to spend a couple of hours with us. I enjoyed my brief opportunity to join in your discussion and wish I could have been there longer. Please know that any time you are back we will be delighted to sit down and cover any topic on which you think we may be able to be helpful. Alternatively, we will be happy to volunteer items in which we think you might have an interest.

One of the comments you made particularly struck me. This was to the effect that there appeared to be a fair amount of information available in our channels which was not getting through to you and the other key military leaders. I would like to do everything I can to close that gap. As you, Paul and I discussed, there are sometimes problems of our not appreciating what is really of key importance to the military commander because of the Pentagon's reluctance to share data with us. I think the best way to beat that is for us to prove both that we are capable of providing better support and that we are anxious to do it.

In that connection, I am considering undertaking three pilot projects. I would like to find three areas in which there is considerable expertise in the Intelligence Community and particularly in the CIA. I would then like to find three applications of that expertise to military problems and undertake to see what light we could shed on those problems. My hope would be to find one example applicable to the Army, one to the Navy, and one to the Air Force. I would further want to explore whether we could find something relating to an imminent R&D decision, another relating to a major procurement decision, and still another which reflects a tactical concern.

For instance, I would lay on the table as one possibility the following tactical naval problem: How could we better use national collection systems to provide warning to the Sixth Fleet commander of an impending Soviet naval attack? The units of the Sixth Fleet are frequently sitting under the gun of Soviet surface ships, and the Soviets, in effect, have the drop on them. If through national means we can gain any clues that would permit the naval commander to have

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

even five or ten minutes warning, he might substantially improve his tactical position. Could we not only gain such information, but could we transmit it to the tactical commander at sea in a rapid enough manner and without "crying wolf" too often?

This may or may not be a good case. What I am looking for are better examples. If any come to your mind, I would be grateful. On the other hand, I don't want to make a burden of this for you. If nothing strikes you right off the bat, let's just talk about it the next time you are back. I am just anxious to do some experimentation to see if we can't improve the situation you pointed out.

All the best.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Stansfield', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

STANSFIELD TURNER

General Bernard W. Rogers, US Army
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
APO New York, New York 09055

CONFIDENTIAL